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When many people say the same thing, the individual is more likely to endorse this
information than when just a single person says the same. Yet, the influence of
consensus information may be modulated by many personal, contextual and cultural
variables. Here, we study the sensitivity of Chinese (N = 68) and Spanish (N = 82)
preschoolers to consensus in social decision making contexts. Children faced two
different types of peer-interaction events, which involved (1) uncertain or ambiguous
scenarios open to interpretation (social interpretation context), and (2) explicit scenarios
depicting the exclusion of a peer (moral judgment context). Children first observed a
video in which a group of teachers offered their opinion about the events, and then they
were asked to evaluate the information provided. Participants were assigned to two
conditions that differed in the type of consensus: Unanimous majority (non-dissenter
condition) and non-unanimous majority (dissenter condition). In the dissenter condition,
we presented the conflicting opinions of three teachers vs. one teacher. In the non-
dissenter condition, we presented the unanimous opinion of three teachers. The general
results indicated that children’s sensitivity to consensus varies depending both on the
degree of ambiguity of the social events and the presence or not of a dissenter: (1)
Children were much more likely to endorse the majority view when they were uncertain
(social interpretation context), than when they already had a clear interpretation of
the situation (moral judgment context); (2) The presence of a dissenter resulted in
a significant decrease in children’s confidence in majority. Interestingly, in the moral
judgment context, Chinese and Spanish children differed in their willingness to defy
a majority whose opinion run against their own. While Spanish children maintained their
own criteria regardless of the type of condition, Chinese children did so when an “allied”
dissenter was present (dissenter condition) but not when confronting a unanimous
majority (non-dissenter condition). Tentatively, we suggest that this difference might be
related to culture-specific patterns regarding children’s deference toward adults.
Keywords: social development, moral judgment, cross-cultural psychology, testimony, majority, dissenter,
consensus
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INTRODUCTION
Much of our knowledge is acquired from the testimony of others
and not from our direct experience. Historical facts, scientific
constructs, religious beliefs, social values and norms, for example,
are types of human knowledge mainly formed from testimonial
sources. But what makes us accept information provided by
others? One of the variables is the degree of consensus, that
is, how many people say the same thing or hold the same
view. The influence of majority on adults’ decisions or behaviors
has been extensively studied since Asch (1956) seminal work
on conformity (Bond and Smith, 1996). Broadly speaking, the
findings show that the influence of majority varies according
not only to the degree of consensus (e.g., unanimous vs. partial
majorities), but also to other variables, such as an individual’s
prior knowledge (e.g., naïve vs. experienced individuals), the
ambiguity of the task (e.g., a situation more or less open to
interpretation), and various situational determinants (e.g., public
or anonymous responses). Thus, the strength of the majority is
greater when unanimous, the task is new or ambiguous, and the
individual’s response is public (see Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004;
Haun et al., 2013 for a review). Another source of variability in
the way individuals deal with the testimony of others is attributed
to culture. Some cross-cultural studies have reported that adults
socialized in East Asian countries tend to rely on consensus
more than adults socialized in Western post-industrial countries
(Huang and Harris, 1973; Fiske et al., 1998; Kim and Markus,
1999).
Studies conducted in adults far outnumber those conducted in
children. To date, research on children’s sensitivity to consensus
has focused on limited fields of knowledge (vocabulary, objects
functions, perceptual judgments, and physical laws) and has
been based on two main approaches. Some researchers have
studied the influence of consensus or numerical majorities on
children’s endorsement of new information, such as the name
of a new object (Corriveau et al., 2009; Chen et al., 2011;
Cascado et al., 2014; Bernard et al., 2015; Guerrero et al., in
press) or the function of unfamiliar objects (Birch et al., 2008).
Within this line of research, a common experimental scenario is
the conflicting-claims paradigm (Koenig et al., 2004) in which
different informants express different views about a particular
situation, and the child is asked to decide between the options.
A number of other works have assessed children’s sensitivity to
consensus when they have prior beliefs or knowledge about the
issue and the assertion of a majority of informants contradicts
these beliefs. This is based on the Asch’s paradigm, where the
individual is faced with a majority that makes an obviously
erroneous judgment about a very simple perceptual experience
(e.g., judging the relative lengths of three lines, Corriveau and
Harris, 2010; Hanayama and Mori, 2011; Haun and Tomasello,
2011) or about implausible functions of familiar objects (Seston
Schillaci and Kelemen, 2014). Both types of approaches address
whether children show any bias toward majorities, that is,
whether they accept or reject the specific information provided
by the informants.
In general, most of the findings reveal that, from about age 4,
children tend to endorse majority testimony on new information,
such as labels and functions for unfamiliar or ambiguous objects,
whereas they are reluctant to side with a majority making a
judgment that is obviously wrong. For example, in the study
conducted by Corriveau et al. (2009), when deciding the label
for a new object, children tended to select the one proposed
by the majority in about 65% of the trials; by contrast, in
studies based on Asch’s paradigm, less than 30% of the children’s
choices sided with an “erroneous” majority (Corriveau and
Harris, 2010; Hanayama and Mori, 2011; Haun and Tomasello,
2011) (for a critical review, see Hodges, 2014). All these findings
suggest that children’s knowledge base modulates their sensitivity
to the testimony of others, at least in the epistemic contexts
studied in previous research. However, studies with children
are still scarce and many questions remained unanswered. For
the purposes of the current study, we outline three aspects that
deserve further attention: the influence of consensus on children’s
decisions about social matters, a domain particularly neglected
in past research; the role of dissenters, that is, the presence of
an informant who opposes the majority view; and the role of
children’s cultural background. We briefly discuss these aspects.
The social domain is, for various reasons, an interesting
context in the study of the testimony of others. First, social
events are, by their very nature, subject to interpretation in the
sense that help may be required from others to understand their
meaning (for example, how to interpret an episode involving
two actors, one crying, the other one just watching?). In many
cases, the rules and motives underlying social interactions are
opaque. Second, the acquisition of social norms and values
takes place through interaction and negotiation with others, who
sometimes hold different or even opposing views. And third,
children of 4–5 years already have knowledge about a wide
range of social matters: They are able to judge familiar social
interactions according to intentions and not merely outcomes;
they apply moral concepts (such as fairness in peer exchanges or
empathy toward a victim) and non-moral concepts (e.g., group
functioning, personal prerogatives) depending on the nature
of the events (Nucci, 2001; Turiel, 2005). Thus, an interesting
question here is how children assimilate the testimony of others
when deciding about familiar and routine social interactions. To
our knowledge, only a few studies have addressed preschoolers’
trust in consensus in contexts of moral decision, presenting
adults as informants (Guerrero et al., in press, with Spanish
participants) or peers as informants (Kim et al., 2016, with
American participants). Although we cannot directly compare
these studies due to the large methodological differences, their
general findings revealed that preschoolers were prone to oppose
to a ‘morally wrong’ consensus, though the rate of resistance to
consensus was higher among the Spanish preschoolers compared
to the Americans. However, in the Guerrero et al. (in press) study
there was always a dissenter whose view coincided with that of the
children. We do not know if children maintain the same position
without the presence of an “allied” dissenter.
There is little research on the role of dissenters in the
testimony of others. Authors have usually addressed the influence
of consensus by presenting either a unanimous majority, as in
the perceptual judgment paradigm (Corriveau and Harris, 2010;
Haun and Tomasello, 2011), or a majority versus a dissenter,
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a standard condition for the novel object labeling paradigm
(Corriveau et al., 2009). Among the few studies comparing
unanimous and non-unanimous majorities, Morgan et al. (2015)
presented US children aged 3–7 years with tasks of quantity
discrimination, varying the degree of consensus among the
informants. Most children trusted the information provided
by unanimous majorities, but only the older children were
also influenced by non-unanimous majorities. In the context
of learning non-conventional functions for familiar objects,
Cascado et al. (2014) found that Spanish children even at 4 years
were sensitive to the presence of a dissenter, resulting in reduced
trust in the majority opinion. Given that these studies differed in
the methodology used and the topic addressed, no conclusions
can be drawn regarding preschoolers’ receptivity to the presence
of dissenters. However, it may be presumed that although non-
conformist or dissenting individuals exist in all societies, the
social reaction to them can vary depending on the cultural
background, among other factors.
As mentioned earlier, several cross-cultural studies with adults
indicate differences in the rate of deference to consensus. In
particular, the research conducted from the individualistic-
collectivistic cultural approach (Triandis, 1995, but see Xiao,
1999, for a critical view) yield findings showing that people
from the so-called collectivistic cultures, such as East Asians,
are usually more inclined to endorse the opinion of a group
in consensus than people from so-called individualistic cultures,
such as the U.S. (Bond and Smith, 1996). Cross-cultural studies
with children are far fewer. To date, most research has been
conducted in Anglo-Saxon countries (specially the U.S. and
U.K.) with participants of European background. The work by
Chen et al. (2013) is one of the few to compare children from
two culturally different countries (U.S. and Taiwan) in tasks of
labeling new objects within the majority-dissenter paradigm. The
authors found that both the Taiwanese and the U.S. children were
more likely to endorse the labels provided by the majority than
by the dissenter, with no differences between countries. Other
studies in the U.S. comparing American preschoolers of different
cultural roots have found a stronger deference toward majority
among Asian Americans than among Caucasian Americans, even
when the majority made a clear incorrect choice (Corriveau
et al., 2013). On the other hand, Chan (2011), Chan and Tardif
(2013) compared children from the U.S. and Hong Kong in
tasks of categorizing ambiguous and non-ambiguous objects and
endorsing unexpected labels proposed by a teacher. Although
her study was not concerned with consensus but with the
influence of an epistemic authority, her results are relevant to
the culture discussion. In particular, contrary to the conventional
assumptions about the East–West cultures, Chan found that
the Hong Kong preschoolers selectively relied on their prior
beliefs to endorse or reject the information provided by the
teacher, while the U.S. preschoolers were more compliant with
the teacher’s claims. An additional example of the mixed findings
with children from different cultures comes from a series of
studies conducted with Spanish preschoolers facing labeling tasks
(Guerrero et al., in press) or counting tasks (Enesco et al.,
in press). It should be mentioned that the Spanish culture, in
terms of the cultural approach, is commonly considered as more
collectivistic than American culture but still more self-oriented
than East Asian cultures (Oyserman et al., 2002). According to
this view, one would expect Spaniards to be in between these two
cultures (U.S. and East Asian), in terms of rate of deference to
consensus. However, contrary to this expectation, Guerrero et al.
(in press) found that Spanish preschoolers did not show any bias
toward majority when endorsing new labels; instead, they were as
likely to support the majority claim as the dissenter claim. Also,
in the study by Enesco et al. (in press), the Spanish preschoolers
did not defer to the consensus but relied on their beliefs about
counting procedures to accept or reject the majority’s assertions.
In sum, the still few studies with young Spaniards reveal a
fairly limited influence of consensus in their decisions. However,
in view of the scarce and heterogeneous research, it would be
daring to draw conclusions about the relations between cultural
background and sensitivity or deference to majority.
The main objective of the present work is to study Chinese
and Spanish children’s endorsement of the majority testimony
regarding social matters, and whether the presence of dissenters
modulates their trust in majority. We created two social decision
contexts depicting events that are familiar and significant
for children. In one scenario -social interpretation context-,
children were presented with ambiguous social events open to
interpretation. In the other scenario -moral judgment context-,
children were presented with non-ambiguous events regarding
the exclusion of a peer. In all cases, the informants (majority
and dissenters) were adults acting as teachers in a school setting.
We decided to present teachers instead of simply adults because
teachers are important epistemic figures for children whom they
attribute not only expert knowledge but also benevolence and
honesty (Olson and Bruner, 1996). The strength of the majority
in children’s decisions was assessed by two means: On one
hand, we compared between-subject children’s choices in two
conditions, with and without dissenter; on the other hand, we
presented within-subject different majority’s view across trials of
each context (e.g., approving exclusion or condemning exclusion,
see Table 1 for details). In contrast to most previous research,
children were not only asked to make a two-option choice but
also to provide reasoned justifications for their choices (i.e.,
why they agreed with this particular opinion). The assessment
of children’ justifications may enhance our understanding of
the influence of the testimony of others. We included a warm-
up consisting of learning new words to determine children’s
overall confidence in majority within this paradigmatic context
of naïveté.
We targeted children from 4 to 6 years for two reasons.
First, 4 years is the youngest age at which children clearly
show sensitivity to the information offered within the testimony
experimental paradigm. Second, the vast majority of previous
research has been conducted with children aged 4–6 years, which
provides us with a solid basis for comparison.
Based on previous research, we expected children to rely
on the consensus significantly more when uncertain about
what happened (social interpretation context) than when they
recognize the situation as an explicit moral transgression for
which they have strong prior beliefs (moral judgment context).
We also expected the presence of a dissenter to decrease
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TABLE 1 | Schematic summary of the procedure.
Context No. Trial Majority view Dissenter/Alternative view
Object labeling warm-upa 1 Li-La (Reso) is object A Li-La (Reso) is object B
2 Feibo (Teno) is object A Feibo (Teno) is object B
Social interpretationb
Majority pro intentional 3 A was intentionally pushed by B A accidentally fell off
Majority pro accidental 4 A accidentally fell off A was intentionally pushed by B
Moral judgmentb
Majority approve 5 Peer exclusion is right Peer exclusion is wrong
Majority condemn 6 Peer exclusion is wrong Peer exclusion is right
Trials were presented in the same fixed order across participants as shown below. aLabels used in each language (Spanish in parenthesis). All objects and pseudo-words
were made-up for this study and had been pre-tested with a small sample of 4–6 year-olds to ensure that children were unable to guess what the objects were and what
the words meant. bDrawings used in the two social contexts were adapted from McGlothlin et al. (2005), and Guerrero et al., in press.
children’s endorsement of the majority view. We do not make
specific predictions regarding cultural background, given the
heterogeneous findings of previous studies. However, Chinese
and Spanish societies may differ in aspects relevant to the issues
addressed in this work. In particular, respect for elders and
their teaching is a social value traditionally ascribed to the
Chinese culture but not to the Spanish culture (Chao and Tseng,
2002). This alleged difference in children’s orientation to elders
might influence the way Chinese and Spanish children weigh the




A total of 92 Chinese children aged 4–6 years (M
age = 60 months; range: 44–75, 46 females), and 106 Spanish
children 4–6 years (M age = 61 months; range: 51–75, 54
females) participated in the study. The Chinese children were
recruited from two schools in the cities of Beijing and Hunan
(China), and the Spanish children from two schools in Madrid
(Spain), all of them serving middle SES families from the
majority ethnic group. Informed consent was obtained from the
parents of all the children, and only children who wanted to
participate took part in the study. Participants were individually
interviewed in their own language by a female researcher: a
native speaker of Mandarin (fourth author) interviewed the
Chinese preschoolers; and a native speaker of Spanish (fifth
author) interviewed the Spanish children. Of this sample, 150
children participated in the experimental group (Chinese:
N = 68, M age= 61 months; range: 44–75, 34 females; Spaniards:
N = 82, M age = 62 months; range: 51–75, 42 females), and
48 children participated in the baseline group –see procedure-
(24 children from each country with equal numbers of boys and
girls, Chinese: M age = 57 months; range: 53–65; Spaniards: M
age = 58 months; range: 54–63). In the experimental situation,
children were randomly assigned to one of the two conditions
with equal number of boys and girls: Dissenter (Chinese: M
age = 59 months; range: 44–77; Spaniards: M age = 62 months;
range: 53–75), and non-dissenter (Chinese: M age = 61 months;
range: 46–75; Spaniards: M age = 61 months; range: 51–75) (see
procedure below). Two-sample t-tests between cultural groups
(Chinese, Spanish) confirmed no age differences in the total
sample, t(192) = 1.55, p = 0.122, or in the experimental group,
t(148)= 1.23, p= 0.223.
Materials
Tasks were presented in a HP Pavilion 15′′ portable. We used
a series of digitalized drawings representing the different types
of peer interactions (adapted from McGlothlin et al., 2005, and
Guerrero et al., in press), see Figure 1. The gender and ethnicity
of the characters depicted matched those of the participants.
We presented short films (∼6 s) that featured the informants
stating their opinion about the abovementioned situations. Both
drawings and videos were different for each trial of each context.
Procedure
Participants assigned to the experimental group began with the
warm-up (two trials), and were then presented with the two
social contexts in the following fixed order: Social interpretation
context (two trials), moral judgment context (two trials) (see
Table 1). All trials were structured as followed: first, the
experimenter presented the situation to be evaluated; second, she
offered the children further information from different groups
of teachers (see Condition below), by showing them a video
in which either three or four female adults (i.e., the teachers),
depending on condition, made judgments about the situation;
third, once the video had ended, the screen showed a still image of
the teachers and the experimenter invited the children to evaluate
the teachers’ claims, and whether or not they agreed with them;
and finally, after their decision, the children were asked to give a
justification.
Condition: Dissenter and Non-dissenter
Children from the experimental group were presented with
one of the two conditions: The dissenter and non-dissenter
conditions. In the dissenter condition (3 vs. 1), we presented
three informants forming a numerical consensus and a dissenter
disagreeing with the majority. The location of the dissenter on
either the left or right of the numerical majority was alternated
across trials. Also, the order in which informants spoke and
were mentioned by the experimenter, either dissenter or majority
first, was alternated across trials. This was done to avoid any
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FIGURE 1 | Example of the drawings used for (A) the Social Interpretation and (B) the Moral Judgment tasks (adapted from McGlothlin et al., 2005,
and Guerrero et al., in press). The gender and ethnicity of characters depicted matched those of the participants.
memory effect on children’s responses. In the non-dissenter
condition (3 vs. 0), we presented three unanimous informants.
The amount of informants agreeing was kept constant across
conditions (always three) to avoid potential confounding derivate
from a varying number of majorities; that is, the condition
varied only in the presence or not of a dissenter, but not in the
number of the members of the majority. In both conditions,
informants were female adults from the same racial group as
the participants (either Chinese or Spanish) and were introduced
as teachers; they all had similar body types and neutral facial
expressions. It is important to highlight that the identity of
informants systematically varied throughout the study so that
children always saw different groups of persons in each trial
and for each context. This was done to prevent participants
from categorizing informants according to their previous opinion
(either dissenter or majority view).
Contexts of Decision
Warm-up (object labeling context)
Children started with two warm-up trials. In the first one,
participants were presented with two novel objects placed on
a table in front of them. The experimenter (hereafter, E) said
one of the two objects was named li-la /reso (Chinese and
Spanish pseudo-words, respectively), but did not know which
one; therefore, she had asked some teachers. She then presented
a video that varied according to the condition. In the dissenter
condition, participants viewed four females and the same two
objects on a table while a voiceover asked: “Which of these
things is a li-la?” Then, three of the females pointed at object
A, while the other female pointed at object B. To ensure the
children understood the events, E repeated the information:
“These teachers said this is a li-la [E pointed at the three teachers
in consensus and object A], and this teacher said that this is a li-
la [E pointed at the dissenter and object B].” The non-dissenter
condition was similar to the dissenter condition, except that the
video featured only three females pointing at the same object.
After watching the video, E asked the participants to choose either
the majority view or the dissenter/alternative view. The same
procedure was followed for the second trial, using two different
novel objects and a different pseudo-word (fei-bo and teno for
Chinese and Spanish children, respectively).
Social interpretation context
After the warm-up trials, the participants were presented the
social interpretation and the moral contexts. In the social
interpretation context, they completed two trials in which a
purposely ambiguous social situation was presented (see Table 1).
In the first trial (Majority pro intentional interpretation), the
numerical majority interpreted what had happened as an act
of harm. E presented a drawing showing two characters in a
playground; one of them (e.g., María) is on the ground in front
of a swing and the other (e.g., Julia) standing behind the swing
(see Figure 1). E told the participant that she did not know what
had happened, María had either fallen off the swing or Julia had
pushed her off (for the sake of simplicity, hereafter the characters
will be mentioned as A and B). E suggested seeing what the
teachers said about this, and presented a video that varied across
conditions. In the dissenter condition, three females state one
by one that A was intentionally pushed off by B, and a fourth
female states that A accidentally fell off the swing. In the non-
dissenter condition, no dissenter was presented and a unanimous
majority by turn provides the intentional interpretation. After
watching the video, E repeated the information provided by the
informants in the same order in which they spoke in the video
(in the non-dissenter condition, she also stated the alternative
view): “These teachers [pointing at the majority] said that Julia
pushed María off the swing, and this teacher [pointing at the
dissenter] said that María fell off.” Then, E asked: “Who do you
think is right? The three teachers who say Julia pushed María off
or the teacher who says that María fell off” (dissenter condition);
“Do you think the teachers that say Julia pushed María off are
right or wrong?” (non-dissenter condition). In the second trial
(Majority pro accidental interpretation), the numerical majority
interpreted the event as an accident. The situation depicted in the
drawing consisted of two children in a playground, one of them
laying on the ground and the other standing nearby. Note that the
procedure for the second trial matched the one for the first trial
except that the majority defended an accidental interpretation
of the social interaction (Majority pro accidental interpretation).
In the non-dissenter condition, all three females stated that A
fell off accidentally, and in the dissenter condition, three females
gave the accident version while a fourth female interpreted what
had happened as intentional (A was pushed by B). The order
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of trial presentation (majority pro intentional interpretation first
followed by majority pro accidental interpretation) was kept
constant across participants.
Moral judgment context
Finally, we presented participants with two situations in which a
child was explicitly excluded from a peer interaction (see Table 1).
In the first trial, the majority approved the exclusion of the peer
(Majority approve exclusion). The participants viewed a drawing
showing three children at a birthday party, and another child
sitting outside the house looking inside. E explained that one
child (e.g., Lan-lan) had invited some children to her birthday
party but that she hadn’t invited Hong-hong, the child sitting
outside. Then, E invited the participant to see what some teachers
said about what Lan-lan had done. In the dissenter condition,
the participants viewed a video featuring four females, each of
them voicing their opinion one by one, as in the social interaction
context. Three females said what Lan-lan had done was right;
the fourth female said it was wrong. In the non-dissenter
condition, the story and procedure were the same except that
the video showed only three females giving a unanimous opinion
approving the exclusion of the peer. After watching both videos,
E repeated the information provided by the informants, and then
asked: “Who do you think is right? The three teachers who say
that it’s OK not to invite her or the teacher who says it’s not OK”
(dissenter condition); “Do you think the teachers that say it’s OK
not to invite her are right or wrong?” (non-dissenter condition).
In the second trial (Majority condemn exclusion), the majority
condemned the peer exclusion. The participants were presented
with a drawing showing three children playing on a playground
on the monkey bars (see Figure 1). A child was sitting to one
side, looking at the group but not playing. E explained that the
group of children hadn’t let the other child play with them. Then,
E invited the participant to see what some teachers had said about
what the children had done. In the dissenter condition, three
females condemned the exclusion while the fourth one approved
it. In the non-dissenter condition the video featured only three
females condemning the exclusion. The subsequent questions
were analogous to those raised in the first trial. The order of
trial presentation (majority approve exclusion first, followed by
majority condemn exclusion) was the same for all participants.
The two social contexts just described were supposed to differ
in their degree of ambiguity: The social interpretation context
being open to interpretation (either as an accident or an action
of harm) and the moral judgment context being unambiguously
interpreted as morally wrong. To confirm these expectations, we
tested an additional sample of participants from each country (24
Chinese, 24 Spanish) –baseline group, using the same materials
as for the experimental group except that no informants were
present. Children were presented first with the two trials of
the social interpretation context, and then with the two trials
of the moral judgment context. In each trial of both contexts,
participants were shown the same drawings described before, and
were then asked to evaluate the situations depicted and to justify
their choices. The questions asked were: “What happened?” in
the social interpretation context and “Was it right/wrong?” in the
moral judgment context.
Coding and Data Analyses
Our main dependent variable was majority endorsement, that
is, whether children chose the majority option (scored 1) or the
alternative option (scored 0). We also analyzed the children’s
justifications. Here we measured (1) whether or not children
provided a justification for their choices, and (2) the content of
the justification. Regarding the former, “Don’t know” responses
and circular arguments (e.g., “Because she fell down”; “Because
it isn’t right”) were coded as non-justifications. In all contexts
we found justifications based on consensus (explicit mention of
the informants, e.g., “because all the teachers said so”), but other
justifications were also provided, based on different arguments,
specific to each context. In the social interpretation context,
children’s explanations fell into two additional categories,
which consisted of adding further information to the story in
accordance with the participant’s interpretation: either as an
intentional act of harm (act-of-harm enriching, e.g., “She pushed
the other girl because she wanted to get on the swing”) or as
an accident, non-intentional outcome (accident enriching, e.g.,
“The kid fell down because he was running”). In the moral
judgment context, children’s justifications fell into two additional
categories: moral concerns (references to fairness or empathy
toward the excluded child, e.g., “I’m sure she feels sad because she
would like to be there. . .”; “It’s not fair! They shouldn’t leave him
alone”), and reason for excluding (providing a motive or rationale
for the exclusion, e.g., “They didn’t let her play because she was
too little and could be hurt”). In the warm-up object labeling
context, children justified their choices referring to consensus and
to physical traits of the novel object (relating the name to some
trait of the object, e.g., shape, color).
We first present the general trends of children’s overall
endorsement of the majority view and the number of children’s
justifications in the experimental group. For this purpose, we
analyzed children’s performance across all the contexts, including
the warm-up trials. As mentioned before, the warm-up trials
allowed us to evaluate children’s endorsement of the majority in a
paradigmatic context of naïveté. Secondly, we focus on the main
analyses conducted within each context, given the differential
nature of the epistemic contexts. Here we explored children’s
choices and the content of their justifications in accordance with
the categories presented above. We used categorical analyses:
one-sample binomial tests to assess (1) whether children from the
experimental group endorsed the majority view more frequently
than the alternative option and (2) whether children from the
baseline group chose one of the two evaluations more often than
chance; Chi-Square tests and Mann–Whitney tests to compare
children’s choices and justifications between conditions and
countries; McNemar tests for comparisons between trials.
RESULTS
Preliminary analyses indicated that girls and boys did not
differ in their trust in majority within each context, Object
labeling: χ2(1,300) = 2.67, p = 0.102, Social interpretation:
χ2(1,300) = 0.07, p = 0.1796 and Moral judgment:
χ2(1,300) = 2.59, p = 0.108. Likewise, we found no significant
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effects of the age of participants (in months) on their likelihood
of siding with the majority (χ2 = 1.194, df = 1, p = 0.275),
or order of presentation of the majority vs. dissenter view on
children’s decisions to side with the majority, χ2(1,900) = 2.09,
p = 0.148. Therefore, none of these variables were included in
the analyses reported below. All reported p-values are two-tailed.
Considering the data collapsed across all six trials, children
were significantly more willing to endorse the majority
view than to choose the alternative, χ2(1,900) = 256.00,
p < 0.001. Although this choice pattern remained constant
across conditions [Non-dissenter: χ2(1,450)= 200.00, p< 0.001;
Dissenter: χ2(1,450) = 72.00, p < 0.001], the presence of
a dissenter resulted in a significant decrease in the majority
choices, χ2(1,900)= 21.62, p< 0.001. No differences were found
between countries in their general endorsement of majority,
χ2(1,900) = 2.36, p = 0.125. However, analyses by condition
revealed that the Chinese children were more likely to follow a
unanimous majority (non-dissenter condition) than the Spanish
children [χ2(1,450) = 5.83, p = 0.016], but they did not differ in
the dissenter condition, χ2(1,450)= 0.00, p= 1.00.
Regarding justifications across all six trials, the presence of a
dissenter significantly increased children’s general likelihood of
providing a justification, χ2(1,900) = 4.55, p = 0.033. However,
the Spanish children were more willing than the Chinese to
give a justification for their choices (60 and 36% of occasions,
respectively), χ2(1,900)= 52.94, p< 0.001.
Analyses on the general differences among contexts (with data
collapsed across trials and conditions within each task) indicated
that children’s endorsement of majority also depended on the
context, Cochran’s Q test, χ2(2) = 57.13, p < 0.001. Pair-wise
comparisons using continuity-corrected McNemar tests with
Bonferroni correction showed that children were significantly less
likely to side with majority in the moral judgment context than
the social interpretation context and the object labeling warm-up
(ps< 0.001), but that the majority choice was equally frequent in
these two latter contexts (p> 0.0125). Note, however, that within
each context, trials differed in what the majority opined, and this
might have affected the children’s choices. Therefore, data within
context must be analyzed before drawing any conclusion.
Warm-Up (Object Labeling Context)
Children’s choices of the majority were unaffected by trial
number, therefore we present analyses on data collapsed across
this factor, McNemar tests, Spanish: n = 82, p = 1.00; Chinese:
n = 68, p = 0.752. The Chinese and Spanish children did not
differ in their overall confidence in majority in the labeling
context, χ2(1,150) = 1.51, p = 0.470. Most of the participants’
responses sided with the majority view (non-dissenter condition:
93%, dissenter condition: 83%), although the presence of a
dissenter significantly decreased their reliance on majority,
Mann–Whitney test, U = 2.28, n= 150, p= 0.005.
Justifications
Regarding the justifications, the Spanish children (65% of
occasions) were more willing to justify their choices than the
Chinese (47% of occasions), χ2(1,300) = 9.35, p = 0.002.
However, when they provided one, Chinese and Spanish children
did not differ in the type of justifications (physical traits and
consensus), χ2(1,170) = 0.001, p = 0.973. Specifically, children
from both countries gave the same amount of physical trait
justifications (42%) as consensus justifications (58%), regardless
of the condition, dissenter vs. non-dissenter, in which they
participated, χ2(1,170)= 1.23, p= 0.267.
Social Interpretation Context
The participants in the baseline group, in which no informants
were presented, showed no preferred interpretation in either trial
(Binomial tests, Trial 1: p = 0.194; Trial 2: p = 0.470, ns = 48):
Nearly half (42%) of the responses consisted of an accidental
interpretation (A fell off by accident) and the remaining (58%)
consisted of an intentional interpretation (A was pushed by B).
There were no differences between nationalities, χ2(1,48)= 2.43,
p= 0.297.
Majority Pro Intentional Interpretation
When the majority interpreted the situation as an intentional
act of harm (A was pushed by B: Majority pro intentional
interpretation) Chinese and Spanish children did not differ
in their choices [χ2(1,150) = 0.343, p = 0.558], with
most participants (88%) consistently siding with the majority.
Moreover, children’s trust in majority was unaffected by the
presence of a dissenter, who said that the character had fallen off
by accident, χ2(1,150)= 1.01, p= 0.315 (see Figure 2).
Majority Pro Accidental Interpretation
When the majority provided an accidental interpretation (A fell
off by accident: Majority pro accidental interpretation), again we
found no differences between the Chinese and Spanish children,
χ2(1,150) = 0.244, p = 0.622. Although the majority view was
the most frequent choice in both conditions (binomial tests,
non-dissenter: p < 0.001; dissenter: p = 0.038, ns = 75), when
presented with the dissenter interpreting the situation as an
act of harm, a significant third of participants supported this
interpretation, χ2(1,150)= 10.01, p= 0.002 (see Figure 2).
Justifications
As found in the previous context, the Spanish children gave
significantly more justifications than the Chinese in both social
interpretation trials, majority pro intentional interpretation:
χ2(1,150) = 24.53, p < 0.001; majority pro accidental
interpretation: χ2(1,150) = 38.04, p < 0.001. While the Chinese
children justified only 21% of their elections, the Spanish
did so on 66% of the occasions. Given the small number of
Chinese children who provided justifications, we were not able
to run comparative analyses on the content categories. For
this reason and because children from both countries did not
differ in their choices of the majority, analyses were ran on
data collapsed across country. Nevertheless, we also present the
amount of justifications per country in parentheses. Overall,
the proportion of consensus justifications (30%; Chinese: 7 out
of 28; Spaniards: 35 out of 108) and the sum of the two
enriching categories (70%; Chinese: 21 out of 28, Spaniards: 73
out of 108) remained constant across trials [χ2(1,136) = 0.029,
p = 0.865] and conditions [χ2(1,136) = 0.053, p = 0.819].
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FIGURE 2 | Siding with the majority view in the social interpretation context. Proportion of Chinese and Spanish children who sided with the majority in the
two trials of the social interpretation context (majority pro intentional and majority pro accidental interpretation) by Condition, non-dissenter (3 vs. 0) and dissenter
(3 vs. 1). ∗∗p < 0.01.
Regarding the enriching categories, children gave more “act-
of-harm enriching” arguments when the majority provided
an intentional interpretation of the situation (58%; Chinese:
11 out of 18; Spaniards: 32 out of 55), and more “accident
enriching” arguments when the majority gave an accidental
interpretation (48%; Chinese: 6 out of 10; Spaniards: 23 out
of 53). More interestingly, in this latter trial, we found a
significant difference between conditions, as found in children’s
pattern of choices: Children gave significantly more “act-of-harm
enriching” justifications in the dissenter than in the non-dissenter
condition, χ2(1,42)= 3.96, p= 0.04.
Moral Judgment Context
In the baseline group, virtually all participants from both
countries (Chinese: 96% and Spanish: 98%) condemned the peer
exclusion in the two moral judgment trials in which they were
asked to evaluate the exclusion events without informants.
Majority Approve Exclusion
In the majority approve exclusion trial, the vast majority of
both Chinese (94%) and Spanish (88%) children rejected the
majority’s opinion when a ‘righteous’ dissenter was present, with
no significant differences between countries, χ2(1,75) = 0.875,
p = 0.349. However, an interesting difference emerged when no
dissenter was present: Only 22% of Spanish children sided with
the unanimous majority compared with 65% of Chinese children,
χ2(1,75) = 14.01, p < 0.001 (see Figure 3). In other words, the
Spanish children condemned the exclusion of a peer regardless
of the condition in which they participated [χ2(1,82) = 1.378,
p = 0.240]; Chinese children, by contrast, were notably more
willing to condemn it in the dissenter than in the non-dissenter
condition, χ2(1,68)= 25.76, p< 0.001.
Majority Condemn Exclusion
Not surprisingly, when the majority concurred with children’s
previous beliefs, virtually all participants sided with the majority
in the dissenter condition (100% of Spanish and 98% of Chinese)
and the non-dissenter condition (98% of Spanish and 100% of
Chinese), see Figure 3.
Justifications
Although the Spanish children (50%) tended to give a justification
more often than the Chinese (39%) [χ2(1,300) = 3.137,
p = 0.08], the distribution across the content categories (moral,
reason for excluding, consensus) was similar for both countries,
χ2(2,137) = 0.05, p = 0.975. Overall, children were significantly
more likely to provide a moral justification for their choices
than any other reason, regardless of the majority opinion on
peer exclusion, either pro (76%) or against (83%) (see Table 2).
However, we found interesting differences between conditions.
Almost twice as many children provided a moral argument in
the dissenter than in the non-dissenter condition. Conversely, in
the latter condition, when presented with a unanimous majority,
children were more reluctant, or less able, to give any kind of
justification.
DISCUSSION
This study examined Chinese and Spanish preschoolers’ use of
consensus in two contexts of social judgment, one involving
ambiguous events that were open to interpretation, the other
context involving explicit (morally relevant) events of peer
exclusion. In a between subject design, we assessed children’s
trust in majority under two types of consensus: Unanimous
(non-dissenter condition, 3 vs. 0) and non-unanimous (dissenter
condition 3 vs. 1). As a warm-up, we included the paradigmatic
context of new object labeling to assess children’s decisions in a
state of naïveté, in contrast with the two social judgment contexts.
The general results indicated that children’s sensitivity to
consensus varies depending both on the nature of the events
(morally relevant or ambiguous) and the presence of a dissenter.
On one hand, children were much more likely to endorse the
majority view when they were naïve (object labeling warm-up)
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FIGURE 3 | Siding with the majority view in the Moral context. Proportion of Spanish and Chinese children who sided with the majority view in the two trials of
the moral judgment context (majority approve exclusion and majority condemn exclusion) by Condition, non-dissenter (3 vs. 0) and dissenter (3 vs. 1). ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
TABLE 2 | Justifications in the moral judgment context.
Justifications
Condition Trial Moral Reason for excluding Consensus Non-justification
Non-dissenter (3 vs. 0) Majority approve 0.24 0.09 0.04 0.63
Majority condemn 0.27 0.07 0.03 0.64
Total 0.25 0.08 0.03 0.63
Dissenter (3 vs. 1) Majority approve 0.44 0.04 0.04 0.48
Majority condemn 0.51 0.01 0.05 0.43
Total 0.47 0.03 0.05 0.45
Proportion of justifications by Condition and trial. “Majority approve” refers to the trial in which the majority approved the exclusion of a peer. “Majority condemn” refers to
the trial in which the majority condemned the exclusion of a peer. The row “total” refers to the mean proportion of justifications for each condition (collapsed across trial).
or uncertain (social interpretation context) about the situation,
than when they already had strong beliefs (moral judgment
context). On the other hand, participants were sensitive to
the type of consensus, in that the presence of a dissenter
reduced their willingness to side with the majority. Regarding
the dissenter condition, the Chinese and Spanish children
responded similarly: They consistently followed the lead of the
majority, except when the majority approved the exclusion of
a peer; in this case, most children sided with the dissenter.
Nevertheless, in the non-dissenter condition, an unexpected
picture emerged: Most Spanish children opposed the unanimous
(pro-exclusion) majority while most Chinese sided with it.
These results might suggest an interesting cultural difference
in sensitivity to dissenters. Chinese children seemed to depend
(at least, in part) on the presence of an “allied” dissenter to
express their opinion; by contrast, Spanish children maintained
their own criteria regardless of the type of consensus (with
and without dissenter). It should be remembered that virtually
all participants in the baseline group (without informants)
from both countries condemned the peer exclusion, and
not surprisingly, children from the experimental group also
sided with the “righteous” majority rejecting exclusion, either
unanimous or non-unanimous.
Overall, there is converging evidence that from early ages
children selectively trust the testimony of others. Facing
uncertainty, children are likely to use others’ testimony as
evidence about reality; what some authors have described as
a bias to copy when uncertain (e.g., Morgan et al., 2015). By
contrast, children’s own criteria may prevail over the testimony
of others when exposed to conflicting information (Chan, 2011;
Einav, 2014) (see Mills, 2013 for a review). Our results with the
Spanish children fit this general trend but this was not the case
with our Chinese participants. One possible explanation could
be that the Chinese “suspended” their own criteria in deference
to a unanimous majority composed of teachers, and this might
be due to a culture-specific pattern related to children’s attitude
toward adults. As found in some cross-cultural research, Chinese
children are not likely to challenge the authority of adults and
show a respectful deference toward adults’ decisions even when
they conflict with children’s own interests. In this line, in a
study on moral reasoning in Chinese children, Fang et al. (2003)
found that they elaborated arguments to justify an apparently
arbitrary decision of the parents. An alternative interpretation
is that Chinese children might be more inclined to infer that
the adult informants approving the exclusion of a peer had a
good reason to do so. In particular, these children might have
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attributed different meanings to the story, adopting a “moral”
perspective when at least one of the teachers condemned the
exclusion, or adopting a “social-organizational” perspective when
nobody condemned the exclusion (for converging evidence, see
Yau and Smetana, 2003). This interpretation is coherent with the
findings by Killen et al. (2001) showing that preschoolers may
reason about exclusion in terms of moral standards (e.g., when
the exclusion is solely based on gender or race), or on the basis of
conventional concerns (e.g., when the inclusion of the peer might
interfere in the functioning of the group). Our data do not enable
this question to be answered, in particular, whether deference
toward adults makes children seek an alternative interpretation
of the situation. A more in-depth interview might have helped to
further explore these hypotheses.
It might also be asked why the Spanish children hardly took
into account the opinion of a majority of teachers, irrefutable
figures of epistemic authority. Previous studies have also shown
Spanish children’s marked tendency to oppose a majority of
adults making claims that run counter to children’s prior ideas
(Cascado et al., 2014; Guerrero et al., in press). One of the studies
comparing Spanish and US children within moral judgment
contexts showed that the Spanish were more likely than their US
peers to reject the majority claims in favor of their own criteria
(Guerrero et al., 2013). More surprisingly, Spanish preschoolers
rejected the opinion of not only a majority of adults but also their
own teacher when suggesting non-conventional (but plausible)
uses of common objects (e.g., using a bottle to drink soup or
a fork to comb one’s hair; (Guerrero et al., in press). In the
same line, within the context of number, Spanish children aged
4–7 opposed the claims of a majority of teachers regarding
correct but unconventional procedures of counting (Enesco
et al., in press). Regarding this apparent “lack of deference”
to authority, we can speculate about the educational system
and the subtleties of the child-teacher relationship in Spain,
compared to other countries. One difference can be found in
norms of discipline and conventions both inside and outside
the classroom such as, for example, the rules about participation
in class or the way they address teachers and other adults
(e.g., Spanish children often completely ignore turn-taking).
It is common that teachers describe their Spanish pupils as
much more bustling, disrupting or unruly than pupils from
other cultural roots (e.g., Asians, Latin Americans). The Talis
survey (Spanish Ministry of Education, 2013) indicates that
Spain is one of the OECD countries where secondary teachers
waste more time dealing with students’ interruptions in the
classroom. Although there are currently no similar surveys
with preschool- and primary school teachers, it is conceivable
that such classroom dynamic arise long before the secondary
years.
It is tempting to frame these findings within theories of
individualist-collectivist cultural values. From this perspective,
East-Asian societies (e.g., Chinese, Japanese, and Korean)
are usually described as emphasizing conformity, group
connectedness and solidarity in order to preserve social
harmony, whereas Western societies are characterized by
emphasizing freedom and individual rights in order to assert
self-worth in the face of collective pressure (Kim and Markus,
1999; see the meta-analysis by Bond and Smith, 1996). But,
where should Spanish society is placed on this continuum? In
principle, Spanish culture could be considered as essentially
collectivistic (at least, following the traditional characterization
of Latin cultures, see Triandis, 1989). However, our current
results with Spanish children contradict this assumption. Indeed,
this longstanding characterization of societies as collectivistic
vs. individualistic entails a considerable oversimplification.
To talk about supra-entities such as “East-Asian” culture has
little meaning if this category includes people from countries
as different as Japan, China or Korea, in terms of their present
cultural values. As different authors have pointed (Killen and
Wainryb, 2000; Turiel, 2004), this representation of cultures
neglects the within-culture complexities of social interactions
and the diversity of people’s social judgments. Killen et al.
(2002) studied Japanese and US children’s judgments about
the exclusion of a peer in different contexts, and found that
context, rather than culture, was the most consistent predictor
of children’s evaluations. Similarly, our findings reveal that
the effect of culture is subordinated to the type of context and
mediated by the presence of a dissenter.
Another interesting finding of the present study is related
to the social interpretation context. In this context, when the
majority of informants opted for the interpretation of an act of
harm (i.e., A was pushed by B), children consistently sided with
them, and they did so regardless of the presence of a dissenter
(whose opinion was that A fell off by accident). Interestingly, the
picture was slightly different in the reverse situation in which
the majority provided a non-intentional interpretation. In this
case, even though children continued to side with the majority
in both conditions, the presence of a dissenter interpreting the
situation as an act of harm resulted in a third of participants
supporting this view. This bias was displayed by both Chinese
and Spanish children even when, as a group, neither presented
a preferred interpretation of what happened in the absence of
informants, as it shown in the baseline group. This finding is
not discussed in much depth here because it was not part of our
research question. However, it is worth noting that this could
be interpreted as evidence of a negativity bias. There is some
empirical evidence that children, in the same way as adults,
are more likely to attend to negative than positive information
in a variety of contexts (for a review see Vaish et al., 2008,
but see Boseovski and Lee, 2008 for different findings). Some
studies have revealed that from preschool age, children talk and
recall negative events in a more sophisticated way than positive
events (Lagattuta and Wellman, 2002; Fivush et al., 2003). This
asymmetry might also be present in the context of the testimony
of others, in that children may be influenced by the valence of
the information. Alternatively, this finding could be due to the
fact that the interpretation as an act of harm is informatively
richer than the accident interpretation because the former implies
a two-party interaction driven by a psychological motive, and the
latter depicts a non-social accidental event. In any case, it would
be interesting to further investigate the valence of information
provided by others within the field of testimony, particularly,
whether positive information (e.g., B is helping A to rise up)
biases in the same way as negative information.
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We will now discuss the children’s justifications. Overall, these
results give additional support to the idea that children selectively
attend to consensus, and that their base knowledge is a key
variable to decide whether or not to endorse the testimony of
others. In coherence with children’s general endorsement of the
majority view across contexts, a consensus-based justification was
provided (e.g., “because all the teachers said that”) on about 60%
of the occasions in the labeling context (no prior knowledge),
30% in the social interpretation context (uncertainty), and less
than 10% in the moral judgment context (strong convictions).
The analyses of the justifications also provided evidence about
children’s sensitivity to dissenting opinions. In the dissenter
condition, that is, when two opposite views were represented,
children were more willing, or able, to provide a justification.
This was particularly evident in the moral judgment context,
where both Chinese and Spanish children gave significantly more
moral arguments in the dissenter condition than when only
one option was available (non-dissenter condition), and this
occurred regardless of whether the informants condemned or
approved exclusion. This finding suggests that facing conflicting
opinions may encourage children to reason about or seek an
explanation for dissenting beliefs. The only difference between
countries was found in the amount of justifications, with Spanish
children providing, overall, more arguments than Chinese
children. This may be interpreted in line with the hypothesis
of a cultural difference in children’s orientation toward adult
authority. It seems plausible that children from both countries
saw the experimenter (and not only the informants in the
video) as an authority, but that the Chinese were more reluctant
than the Spanish to express themselves freely in front of an
adult.
The current study has some limitations and raises interesting
questions for future research. First, in this kind of paradigm,
the informants (individuals transferring the knowledge) do
not provide the social cues that are essential in the process
of social communication. This might preclude children from
understanding what is going on. For instance, hearing a
group of teachers condoning the exclusion of a peer with
no further justification is probably perplexing for children,
and we cannot rule out that our participants would have
responded differently if given some explanation or rationale
(e.g., they were not friends and Li-li invited only her very
close friends). A few studies provide a good illustration of
the subtle differences that arise when children are given –or
not-information about the circumstances or reasons underlying
the informants’ behaviors and how this relates with the type
of knowledge implied (Nurmsoo and Robinson, 2009a,b).
A more general concern about this paradigm has been
well noted by Howe (2014), who stated that this type of
experimental setting is concerned with children’s acceptance
or rejection of verbal information from others, rather than
social influence on children’s learning and knowledge acquisition.
Following Hodges’ (2014) suggestions, to better comprehend
the way children acquire or revisit their prior ideas in light
of the testimony of others, future research in this field
should create more realistic settings in which children are
allowed to exchange ideas with others, that is, a setting
preserving the conversational nature of an interaction among real
people.
Second, like most research in this field, our study focuses
on a limited age range and, in this sense, lacks a genuine
developmental perspective. We can assume that the socio-
cognitive changes that take place during childhood do affect
the way children weigh different variables related to the
informants (e.g., accuracy, epistemic authority), the context (e.g.,
serious, pretend), the content of information, and the degree
of congruity with one’s ideas. Also, as children develop and
individual differences strengthen, their sensitivity to consensus
might take different trajectories, more or less deferential or
oriented to conform with consensus, more or less tolerant of
dissent/deviance, as the literature with adults has shown (for
a review see Hodges, 2014). Since no previous studies have
adopted a comprehensive developmental view on these aspects,
this deserves extensive research.
As a whole, our data suggest that from early ages, children
take into account a series of variables when deciding whether
or not to follow the lead of the majority. One of the relevant
factors is the presence of a dissenter, which seems to stimulate
children’s willingness to evaluate the information. In the face
of conflicting claims, our participants not only reduced their
confidence in majority but were also more likely to provide a
reasoned justification for their choices. Children’s decisions to
use the testimony of others were partly conditional upon their
degree of certainty about what happened: When having a clear
interpretation of the situation, they were far less influenced by
consensus than when facing an ambiguous event. Interestingly,
this general trend seemed to be modulated by culture, in that
Chinese children were less willing than the Spanish to stick
to their guns vis-à-vis a unanimous majority. However, this
picture is highly provisional given the scarcity of cross-cultural
studies on the testimony of others, and in particular, within the
social domain. Crucially, empirical efforts should be directed
at unraveling the developmental, individual and cultural factors
affecting the way children evaluate the information provided by
others.
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